Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2022

What Do Good Lawyers Know that the Rest of Us Don't?
Introducing First-Year Law Students to 'Legal Realism'
Gregory S. Crespi

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

WHAT DO GOOD LAWYERS KNOW THAT THE REST OF US
DON'T? INTRODUCING FIRST-YEAR LAW STUDENTS TO
"LEGAL REALISM" (White Paper)
Gregory Crespi'

I set forth below the general outline of a short lecture that I usually give to my
first-year contract law students, at about the end of their first week of classes, in
order to get them started thinking about the process of judicial decision-making, and
especially about the "legal realist" perspective on that process.

"As you all start your study of the law, let me ask you a very basic question
that cuts across all of the different fields of law that you will study this year. How
do judges decide cases? What factors influence them in making their rulings? In
particular, how important is "the law"-that is, the formal structure of legal rules
that applies to a given set of facts-in shaping judicial decisions, as opposed to other
social and psychological factors that may influence judges?
Do judges really follow the law in their rulings, wherever this may lead, or do
they just say in their opinions (and confirmation hearings) that they faithfully follow
the law, but do not really mean it, and instead just rule in whatever way pleases them
in any particular case? Does what the law is really make a major difference in how
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judges decide a particular case, or do other factors matter more to them? This as an
important question that you should think a lot about during your legal education.
If you are going to become a good lawyer you are going to have to develop
several skills. First of all, you will need to exercise counseling and planning skills.
You will need to develop the ability to helpfully counsel clients, to help them plan
their affairs so as to avoid legal trouble, by being able to accurately predict how the
courts and other regulators will respond if your client takes certain actions and are
challenged as to their legality.
That counseling and planning can be as simple and routine as answering a
straightforward legal question in a phone call or by a later email. Or it could involve
a little more effort in helping a client draft an ordinary will or standard real estate
conveyance documents. Or, at the other extreme, it could be as complex as spending
hundreds of hours planning and providing the documentation for a major corporate
merger or acquisition transaction. In each instance, to be helpful your advice and
assistance will need to be guided by an accurate assessment of what will happen in
court or before regulatory bodies if your client's actions are later challenged.
Second, you will need to develop advocacy skills, the ability to convince
judges and other decision-makers to decide close cases that do end up in litigation
or in regulatory review in favor of your clients. And third, you will need to develop
political skills, the ability to accurately predict which law reform measures and
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political efforts will be effective in bringing about the results that your clients favor,
and the ability to effectively engage in efforts to persuade others in positions of
influence to embrace your clients' point of view.
To do any of these things effectively you will need to have in mind a
reasonably accurate idea of how judges and other legal decision-makers decide
cases; how the law is actually applied in practice in concrete instances. There is
general agreement that a good lawyer can do all of these things. They can accurately
predict how the courts will rule on a particular matter if a dispute arises so that they
can give good advice on how to avoid legal problems, they can sway a judge to their
client's side in a close case, and they can effectively promote legal and social change.
So there must be something that good lawyers know that enables them to both
accurately predict and effectively influence judicial decisions, and to be effective
law reform advocates.
There is disagreement, however, on exactly why judicial rulings are fairly
predictable to skilled lawyers, and why some lawyers more than others are able to
give good legal advice, and to win close cases, and to effectively promote law
reforms. What do good lawyers know about judicial decision-making that the rest
of us do not?
The debate here among legal scholars as to how judges reach their decisions
usually focuses on two competing models of the adjudication process. I will here
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call these the "formalist" and the "legal realist" models. Let me briefly contrast the
major features of these competing models of adjudication in a simplified and
somewhat exaggerated form in order to make their core principles clear. Most legal
theorists actually take some kind of intermediate position between these two polar
extremes on the question of how court cases are actually decided.

The "Formalist" Model
This model of adjudication reflects the simple "Government of Laws" view of
the world and of judicial decision-making that students usually first learn about in
their junior high school civics classes. The overall body of law is characterized as
being relatively clear, consistent and comprehensive, essentially providing a
definitive social rule book. Judicial discretion in any particular case is therefore
quite limited. The judge first makes the difficult factual determinations as best she
can-deciding what happened, who to believe, and who did what-and then just
rather mechanically applies the applicable law from that social rule book to those
facts in a straightforward fashion to reach the result.
Under this model judicial decisions are determined primarily by the facts and
the law, not by the personal views of the judge, and consequently these judicial
decisions are relatively predictable by anyone who knows both the facts of the case
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and the applicable body of law. One might call this the "baseball umpire" model of
adjudication.
In baseball, a clear and consistent set of rules exists covering all possibilities
that can arise during a game. A baseball umpire has a very limited, essentially factfinding role. A good umpire is sort of invisible, and simply applies the rules of the
game to what takes place on the field. One good umpire will usually make the same
calls as another, given the rules. The pitch is either a ball or a strike, the runner is
either safe or out at first base, the ball is hit either fair or foul, and so on.
If that is how judges work, just like baseball umpires, a good lawyer can pretty
easily predict how a judge will rule in a given case, given a particular set of facts,
and given a knowledge of the applicable rules. A lawyer should try to win their case
by convincing the judge that the facts demonstrate that their client should win under
the applicable rules.
To change how baseball is played, you would have to change the rules.
Changing the umpires, if the rules remain unchanged, would have little if any effect
on how the game is played. For example, if you wanted to change baseball to have
teams score more runs, you could change the rules to allow the batter 4 strikes
instead of just 3, or move the pitching mound back 10 feet, or something else like
that. Changing the umpires without changing the rules would not have much if any
effect on the game. In similar fashion, under this theory of adjudication legal and
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political reform efforts should focus on changing the laws in the way you favor, and
not on changing who the judges are, which will not make much if any difference in
case outcomes.

The Legal Realist Model
Let me now set forth the general outlines of the contrasting "legal realist"
model of how cases are decided.

This conception of how judicial decisions are

actually reached is based instead on a somewhat more complex "Government of
People" model of the decision-making process.
The law is here regarded as incomplete, with lots of gaps that leave many
situations uncovered, and is in many ways vague, ambiguous, and inconsistent.
There are conflicting rules potentially applicable to most situations, and conflicting
policies behind these rules, with no coherent and comprehensive overall framework
available to determine which of the many conflicting rules and policies should apply
in a given situation. The body of legal authority is not an internally consistent rule
book but is instead more of a confusing and contradictory and inconclusive jumble.
Under this model there is very broad judicial discretion as to which rules to
apply to a given case, and how to apply them, and consequently a judge has broad
discretion as to the decisions she reaches in many if not most cases, even without
considering possible uncertainty as to the case facts which would confer even more
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judicial discretion. Judicial decisions are still largely predictable by a good lawyer,
all would agree, but those decisions are not determined primarily by "the law" but
instead are based upon the broader sociological and psychological factors that
influence judges' exercise of their considerable discretion, and which operate in a
relatively predictable fashion to someone who understands those factors.
The legal realists argue that it is the social and economic background of judges
that primarily shapes their world views and their legal decisions, not what the law
is, since the directives provided by the body of law are ambiguous and often
contradictory, and the law that can be applied in any particular case is therefore
extremely malleable. For example, legal realists might argue that since judges in
America have until very recently have been predominantly 50-ish white males from
upper-class or upper middle-class social and economic backgrounds, and are
disproportionately conservative, heterosexual, country club member, law-and-order
types of people, there is obviously going to be a consistency among them in how
they resolve particular cases, a consistency that probably would not exist were the
judges drawn from a more diverse social group, even under the exact same set of
laws.
The legal realists argue that the predictability of judicial decisions that almost
all observers would agree exists, at least to a significant extent, is not because the
law is generally clear and consistent and points all judges to the same results in a
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given case, as the formalists would argue, but instead is because judges who come
from similar social and economic backgrounds will tend to bring the same moral and
political views to bear, or to put this another way, share the same biases, when
choosing which of the many possible legal rationales to adopt to decide a given case.
Who has it right here, the formalists or the legal realists? In my opinion the
legal realists make some very good points that you need to understand. As you will
soon see from your studies, judicial opinions are usually written in a formalist style
denying or at least minimizing the extent to which the judges have exercised
discretion in imposing their own personal views in deciding the case, and
emphasizing the constraining effect of the applicable legal rules.

However, the

arguments and legal justifications presented in judges' opinions may often not be the
real basis upon which they have decided the cases.
While judicial opinions overwhelmingly conform to a formalist model of
adjudication, and thereby suggest that the judges generally have no real choice in
making their decisions given the case facts and the law, I think that this rhetoric of
constraint is misleading and that judges tend to conceal somewhat-perhaps even
from themselves-the extent to which they have exercised choice in the moral and
political premises and legal authority that they have reasoned from to resolve legal
questions.

Judges tend to mask the extent to which they have consciously (or

unconsciously) worked backwards, so to speak, from their basic attitudes and biases
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to reach a legal result and rationale that confirms and supports their preconceptions,
rather than simply applying clear legal rules to the facts before them, whatever the
result may be.
As you will surely come to see in the next few years as you read many close
and difficult cases you can usually make a reasonably good legal argument for either
party in most litigated cases (particularly if there is some uncertainty as to the facts),
usually a good enough argument to provide a sufficient rationale for a judge that
wants to rule your way, but who also wants to be able to write a respectable legal
opinion supporting their ruling so that they won't be criticized and possibly even
reversed on appeal for not following the law.
Now what makes a particular judge want to come out one way rather than
another in a given case surely depends to some extent upon the law, but the legal
realists would argue that while the body of law has some impact on these decisions
they actually depend much more upon the many psychological and sociological
factors that have influenced the judge's thinking. I personally tend more towards
embracing the legal realist view of adjudication, rather than the formalist model,
although I do not always agree with some of the legal realists' more extreme claims
about how indeterminate the law is and how small a role the formal legal rules play
in judicial decisions.
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My long experience of over 30 years as a law school professor has been that
most law students first come to law school as rather extreme formalists, looking to
learn "the law," to learn the contours of the social rule book, just like an aspiring
baseball umpire would want to do. Many students then change rather dramatically,
after just a few weeks of law school, to embrace a rather extreme form of legal
realism once they begin to appreciate from their case readings just how
indeterminate and conflicting the law really is with regard to most contested
questions that reach the appellate court level; just how much room there often is for
judges to exercise their discretion.
Ultimately most law students eventually back off somewhat from this extreme
legal realist view, recognizing it as being an overreaction to their being introduced
to an important insight as to the very broad extent of judicial discretion. By the end
of their law school studies they usually have come to embrace a more nuanced
perspective regarding adjudication. They recognize, first of all, that the law really
is incomplete and internally inconsistent enough that judges can as a practical matter
do just about anything they want to in deciding most cases, but also recognize that
what most judges want to do is not to exercise arbitrary authority, nor favor the
litigants whom they personally like, nor to solicit bribes, but instead to reach legally
and ethically correct decisions. But judges' individual attitudes as to what is the
right thing to do are shaped in a complex manner by their social background and
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training and many other things, including of course, as formalists note, their
understanding of legal authority and precedent, of how other judges have applied the
relevant legal provisions in the past.
In other words, viewed from this more sophisticated perspective, judges really
can do just about whatever they want to in most cases, given the broad choices they
usually have as to what laws to apply and how to apply them, and often also
flexibility as to characterizing the case facts. But their rulings are nevertheless
usually principled and relatively predictable by people who understand their
thinking. But their rulings are not primarily determined by "the law," per se, but
more by the social background and training of the kinds of people who become
judges, although the rulings are definitely influenced in most instances by judicial
understanding as to the nature of the applicable law.
So that is a brief comparison of the contrasting formalist and legal realist
views of judicial decision-making, and a short discussion of how these insights
might be usefully meshed. Let me now note the implications for your counseling
and advocacy efforts on behalf of your future clients, and for your law reform and
political efforts, and even for your law school studies, if you essentially embrace the
formalist model of the adjudication process, or if you instead proceed more on the
basis of the legal realist model of that process.
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Counseling and Planning Implications
When advising clients, if you embrace the formalist perspective you may feel
that you can give pretty definitive legal advice on most matters, once you have
learned the applicable law, because it will then be pretty clear how most disputes
will be resolved. From the legal realist perspective, however, there is quite a lot of
judicial discretion as to how to resolve even seemingly straightforward matters under
what at first facially appear to be clear rules. So from this perspective you should
be a little more cautious in how you advise your clients as to what conduct they can
safely engage in without fear of potential legal liability.
If a particular judge does not "like" your client, in the sense of determining
that justice lies more with the interests of the other party, then even seemingly clear
facts and law might not protect your client from some nasty consequences. There
would be more reason then to think ahead about whom among the possible judges
or regulators would likely be ruling upon any challenge to your client's conduct,
and to attempt anticipate their most fundamental commitments and concerns. To the
legal realist applied psychology and sociology with regard to the specific decisionmaker are as important as traditional legal analysis in framing a persuasive
argument.

Advocacy Implications
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From the formalist perspective the legal rules governing any dispute are
essentially a given-kind of like the rules of a baseball game-that cannot be
effectively argued about. The rules are what they are, and you just have to accept
them. Therefore your advocacy efforts for your client should instead be focused on
convincing the judge that the facts of the dispute are such that your client should win
under those rules. You should therefore emphasize putting the most favorable spin
possible on the evidence as to what actually happened, and not so much on arguing
about what the law is.
If, however, you accept the validity of the legal realist perspective on
adjudication, it has a couple of important implications for your actions as an
advocate. First of all, if the law is in most instances incomplete, ambiguous and
contradictory, as the legal realists claim, then it is also important for you to offer
arguments as to which of the possibly applicable laws should apply to your case, and
why, and how they should apply. In other words, you need to argue about what the
law is that should apply to the case, as well as what the facts are.
Second, when you are trying to convince a judge to rule in favor of your client,
the most important thing is to somehow make the judge like your client more than
she does the opposing party! Now I do not mean "like your client" in the personal,
friendship sense, but in the sense that the judge is convinced that your client's side
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of the case aligns better with truth, justice, and the moral principles most important
to the judge than do your opponent's arguments.
In other words, do not limit yourself to making only technical, narrowly legal
arguments, and arguments about the characterization of the case facts, but try to also
invoke somehow, either in your briefs or other submissions, or perhaps more
informally in your other communications with the judge and his clerks and other
staff, the larger moral and political principles that favor your side and that you think
might make the judge better empathize with you and your client, and thus be more
inclined to rule your way.
You should offer both legal and factual arguments in your briefs, for sure, but
recognize that from the legal realist perspective the real struggle to win a case is
actually fought out on a different, more psychological level for the "soul" of the
judge, so to speak. Once you win that struggle, and the judge is then predisposed to
favor your client, then the judge will be much more inclined to accept your legal
arguments and your characterization of the facts, and to base her formal opinion in
favor of your client on those arguments and facts.
From the legal realist perspective, then, there really are no right or wrong
answers to legal questions. The profession of law is about giving good practical
advice, and winning cases, and achieving sought-after legal and political reforms. It
is not about seeking abstract truth, whatever that may be. Legal practice is what you
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might call an instrumental undertaking, focused on results rather than how you get
there, of course within some obvious ethical constraints that you will be studying in
some of your courses, like prohibitions on blatant lying, hiding evidence, bribery
and other unseemly conduct.
From the legal realist perspective what may appear to be a correct and
convincing legal argument to one decision-maker may well be regarded as incorrect
by another, depending upon their different moral and political views and how they
apply them to the case. Most legal arguments that you might offer in a case will
work with some judges, and not with others. What is the correct legal argument is
what works to convince the judge to rule in your favor. If you win the case, then by
definition you must have said the right things. If you lose the case, then you did not.
From the legal realist perspective law is just a particular language and style of
expression in which you can press claims and make rhetorical arguments, and
definitely not a set of clear and consistent rules.
Like other languages, you can say almost anything you want in "legalese," in
accordance with its vocabulary and grammatical structures, and it makes little sense
to think of legal arguments in terms of being "right" or "wrong" in absolute,
categorical terms. It's really a question of what works, of the usefulness of your
arguments in a given context to persuade a particular decision maker, and not their
abstract correctness. What ultimately counts is whether your legal arguments are
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persuasive to the person you are trying to convince, which according to the legal
realists depends more upon whether your arguments mesh with the psychological
make-up and cultural background of that person you are speaking to than on the logic
and supporting authority of your legal arguments. Know your audience before you
frame your arguments.

Law Reform Implications
From the formalist perspective, simply changing the identity of the judges will
probably have as little effect on the results of cases as changing the identity of the
umpires in a baseball game, where the game will pretty much go on unchanged as
before. To change the results of the legal system you need to change the laws, not
the judges. From the legal realist perspective; however, changing the identity of the
judges and other decision makers is probably more important than changing the law.
For example, if you were trying to change the legal system to more effectively
combat, say, discrimination on the basis of race, or against persons with physical
disabilities, a legal realist would argue that it would probably be more effective to
get more judges appointed and legislators elected that have such minority racial
backgrounds or disabilities, and who therefore can empathize more easily with such
litigants, than it would be to change the law governing the treatment of racial
distinctions or disabled persons.

16

The realists would argue that there is usually already enough law available
pointing in every possible direction for a judge to find adequate legal support to
justify doing what she wants to do.

Hence the increasingly bitter and partisan

political arguments we see about who will be appointed to senior judicial positions,
especially on the US Supreme Court, make perfect sense despite the fact that every
potential appointee, without fail, promises to faithfully follow the law in their
rulings.

Law School Study Implications
From a formalist perspective, your main goals at law school should be to learn
the law, and to learn how to find the applicable rules and their supporting authority,
and to learn how to effectively present the facts of a case and the governing law.
From a legal realist perspective, however, you should not approach this course or
your other courses with the idea that you are just going to learn the law, period. We
professors are not trying to hide the ball when we tell you that it is not so simple, it
is just that from the legal realist perspective that we academics almost all embrace
to some extent there simply is no such thing as "the law" in the sense of there being
a clear social rule book that you can master and then use to just look up the answers
to resolve disputes.
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What actually exists, from the legal realist perspective, is just a variety of
argumentative techniques and rhetorical moves of different sorts that you can offer
in courts or elsewhere that have worked in the past to convince some judges, and
which might or might not continue to work in the future with other judges. You just
pick out and present the laws and supporting arguments that you think will be most
effective in a particular context, before a particular judge or other decision-maker,
and hope for the best.
As I have noted, the large majority of legal opinions are written in a formalist
style that suggests that both the case facts and the applicable law were quite clear,
and that the judge consequently had little if any discretion in deciding the case.
Sometimes the opinions will concede that there is some factual or legal ambiguity
and uncertainty, and that some judicial discretion is therefore being exercised, but
not very often.
The legal realists, however, argue that you should be rather skeptical about
these formalist claims, that you should require some convincing and not just accept
them uncritically. They argue that there is often much more judicial discretion in
decisions than is admitted in the opinions, that there is often a covert (or perhaps
even unconscious) application of the judge's own moral principles and biases in
choosing what law to apply to the case, or how to interpret that law, or even in
characterizing the facts of the case.
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As part of reading and briefing your cases in your classes you should therefore
also give them the "legal realist critique," so to speak, in which you step back a bit
from the logic and details of the opinion and consider whether the case is really as
straightforward as the opinion's usually formalistic discussion suggests.

Was it

really that easy to decide, that straightforward, or was there some significant and
perhaps covert application of the judge's own attitudes and biases in reaching the
decision?

CONCLUSION
Let me end this brief discussion by calling your attention to an important 2007
study of the adjudication process carried out by Cass Sunstein, one of the most
respected and cited law professors in the country, along with several other coresearchers. 2

This study focused narrowly upon the specific role played by the

political affiliation of federal judges, Republican or Democrat or Independent, in
shaping judicial decisions, within the currently (still) relatively homogeneous group
of predominantly upper-middle class, predominantly white, predominantly male and
predominantly heterosexual persons that are now serving as federal judges, as

2

CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY (2007).
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compared to the roles played by "the law" and by other demographic factors in
shaping those decisions.
From a legal realist perspective you would expect that diversity of gender,
race, sexual preference, economic background, etc., among judges would lead to
variation among their decisions even under identical factual and legal circumstances.
What is particularly interesting about the Sunstein study, however, is that he found
that even differences among judges only with regard to their Republican or
Democratic political affiliation, differences in partisan political commitments
among an otherwise demographically and economically and socially relatively
homogenous group of people, has major importance for the results reached in many
kinds of cases of great social significance. This was particularly true for those cases
involving such hot-button social issues reflecting sharp partisan differences as, for
example, decisions regarding abortion rights, campaign finance regulation, gay
marriage, affirmative action, sexual discrimination, and environmental protection.
If this was the situation in 2007 it is surely even more the case today given the
dramatic increase in political polarization among all social groups over the past
decade.
Sunstein's study suggests that the legal realists may have it right regarding the
importance of judicial attitudes and predispositions, and particularly political
orientation, relative to the lesser role played by the formal body of law in deciding

20

these kinds of particularly controversial cases. However, Sunstein also interestingly
found that there are some other areas of law where both Democratic and Republican
judges tend to reach the same results, despite their different ideological orientations
and partisan commitments. This suggests that the formal body of law does constrain
judges to some extent, providing some support for a formalist explanation of judicial
decisions, at least for those areas where the law is unusually clear and is also not so
politically controversial. However, in my opinion, his study overall provides more
support for the legal realist assessment of the ultimate sources of judicial decisions
than it does for the formalist model of adjudication. But that is just my opinion; you
all should think about this a lot as you read many cases over the next few years, and
draw your own conclusions.
Let me close by noting that Sunstein also makes the interesting point that
multi-judge panels of judges that all have the same political affiliation tend to take
more extreme, polarized partisan positions in their rulings than any of those judges
would usually take individually, apparently reinforcing in their deliberations each
other's more extreme partisan tendencies. This finding of a group dynamic tending
toward more extreme results among groups of persons who are all generally in
ideological agreement has broad implications in many contexts, and suggests that
multi-judge judicial panels should perhaps be chosen so as to include at least one
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person from a different political party than the others in order to counter this group
polarization tendency.
With that brief introduction regarding competing views of the process of
adjudication, it is now time for you all to go read those hundreds of cases that you
will be assigned by your professors over the next three years, and try to figure out
for yourselves what those judges are all about!"

22

